Why did Finland experience in 1991-93 the deepest recession observed in an industrialized country since the 1930s? Using a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor frictions, we argue that the collapse of the Soviet-Finnish trade was a major contributor to the contraction. Finland's experience mirrors that of the transition economies of Eastern Europe, which suffered similar deep recessions coupled with institutional changes. By focusing on the Finnish case we isolate the effects of the Finnish-Soviet trade collapse and shed new light on the sources of recessions in transition economies. JEL: E32, F41, P2.
Introduction
Understanding economic depressions has long been one of the central challenges in macroeconomics.
Their massive costs as well as disagreement over their causes and propagation are subject to continuous debate. We The declines are even more dramatic when measured as deviations from trend. Using this metric, value added in the private sector fell about 20 below trend. Over the same period, Finland experienced a quadrupling of unemployment from 3.5 percent to a peak of 16.5 percent, and the stock market lost 60 percent of its value.
We argue that a major cause of the Finnish Great Depression was the costly restructuring of the manufacturing sector and a sudden, sharp increase in energy costs caused by the demise of the Soviet Union. The barter-type trade arrangement between the USSR and Finland skewed Finnish manufacturing production and investment toward particular industries and effectively allowed Finland to export non-competitive products in exchange for energy imports at an overvalued exchange rate.
The collapse of the USSR provides a unique natural experiment for which we know with precision the timing, nature and size of the exogenous shocks that hit the Finnish economy. Furthermore, unlike previous analyses of earlier depressions or downturns in developing economies, we have access to high quality economic data at different levels of aggregation and frequency.
We develop and calibrate a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model that accounts for the key features of the Finnish Great Depression. The model captures the economy's response to the two shocks caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union: the sudden loss of the market for specialized exports to the USSR and the surge in the relative price of imported energy. The model generates large declines in aggregate output, consumption and employment, and replicates the dynamics of the sector devoted to manufacturing goods for export to the USSR, the sector producing goods for the rest of the world, and the nontradables sector. Our simulations suggest that downward wage rigidity coinciding with a contraction in demand for nontraded goods observed in Finland played a key role in the amplification of the downturn produced by these shocks.
We validate our analysis in several ways. First, the model does well at reproducing the dynamics of macroeconomic variables in a previous episode of a sudden rise in energy costs, the oil price hike of the 1970s. In addition, we compare the experience of Finland in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union with that of Sweden. The Swedish economy is widely regarded as sharing many of the same structural features that characterize the Finnish economy, and it went through a similar economic downturn in the early 1990s (including currency and banking crises).
Sweden, however, had only a negligible trade relationship with the Soviet Union. Hence this comparison provides us with a natural experiment in which one country (Finland) was hit by the two shocks triggered by the Soviet collapse and the other (Sweden) was not. Our findings from this comparison support the model's quantitative predictions, because the downturn in Sweden was much milder and of shorter duration than in Finland. Finally, we document that Finnish manufacturing industries exposed to Soviet trade experienced a deeper contraction than those that were not.
The impact of the shocks caused by the collapse of Soviet trade on Finland is interesting in its own right, but it is especially compelling in light of the similar experiences of the Eastern European transition economies (TEs). Panel B in Figure 1 plots the dynamics of real GDP in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Finland. The figure captures the familiar "U-shaped" path for output characteristic for TEs (Blanchard and Kremer 1997, Roland and Verdier 1999) . The remarkable feature of the figure is that the adjustment path for Finnish GDP in the post-1990 period is virtually identical to those observed in TEs. 1 Finland experienced the full force of the shocks induced by the collapse of trade with the USSR, but as a western democracy with developed capital markets and institutions, faced none of the institutional adjustments experienced in TEs. Thus, by studying the Finnish experience we can isolate the effects due solely to the shocks caused by the collapse of trade with the USSR from the other burdens of adjustment borne by TEs. To the best of our knowledge, these results provide the first quantitative assessment of the significance of these shocks for explaining the downturn in these economies. To the extent that these shocks, combined with standard macroeconomic reallocation costs and frictions, can account for the depressions in TEs, the role of other factors such as institutional transformations may be smaller than previously thought.
Other studies have offered alternative explanations of the Finnish crisis. One view is that the origins of the Finnish depression were largely financial, working through the banking sector and ultimately triggering a twin currency-banking crisis (see e.g. Honkapohja et al. 1996) . There is little doubt that financial factors played a role in the persistence and amplification of the crisis-yet, Finland was already two years into the depression at the time of the banking crisis and the large depreciation of the Finnish markka. Still, we do find that a large and unexpected hike in the real interest rate, which we view as a proxy for the financial shock that Finland suffered, enhances the ability of our model to match important features of the macro time series, particularly the size of the investment collapse. Another view on the Finnish depression argues that labor tax hikes and negative productivity shocks may have been the culprit (Conesa et al. 2007 ). However, it is difficult to find 1 In an early contribution, Rodrik (1994) explored the possible impact of trade on output in transition economies. He estimated that the collapse of trade with the USSR could account for a 7 to 8 percent decline in GDP in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and a 3.5 percent decline in Poland. At the time he wrote his article, it was too early to characterize the transition path and U-shaped pattern of output resulting from the loss of trade. Thus, his analysis was necessarily static while we emphasize the dynamic effects. Nonetheless, his work suggested that trade was an important factor in understanding the dramatic decline in output in the early 1990s.
evidence of large tax hikes in available tax rate estimates and policy documents of the time. Also, as we argue below, a decline in measured productivity may be a symptom rather than a cause of contraction in a multi-sector economy.
In the next section, we lay out the key facts about the Soviet-Finnish trade relationship. In Section 3, we develop a dynamic model of the Finnish economy. In Section 4 the model is calibrated using Finnish data before the collapse of Soviet trade. Then we hit the model economy with the shocks caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, as once-and-for-all unanticipated shocks in a deterministic environment, and compare the model's dynamics with the dynamics observed in the data. In Section 5, we evaluate alternative explanations of the depression. In Section 6, we discuss how our conclusion for Finland can be extended to TEs. We make concluding remarks in Section 7.
Finnish-Soviet Trade
We argue that five factors-factors shared with other countries in the socialist bloc-contributed to the deep economic contraction that occurred in Finland following the cancellation of its trade arrangement with the Soviet Union in December 1990. First, the share of total exports to the USSR was large, and a number of manufacturing sectors were particularly dependent on Soviet trade.
Second, exports to the USSR were produced to Soviet specifications. Once the Soviet market collapsed, these goods had no alternative market. Third, the trading arrangement involved the exchange of Finnish manufactures for Soviet oil at an overvalued exchange rate. This meant that Finland simultaneously experienced both the collapse of a major export market and an effective increase in the price of energy. Fourth, the loss of trade with the USSR was largely unexpected.
Finally, the rigidity of wages in Finland meant that the adjustment to the trade shock resolved itself primarily through increased unemployment, rather than an adjustment in wages.
A.
Soviet trade share The Soviet Union was Finland's largest trading partner until the collapse of the Soviet regime, accounting for roughly 20 percent of Finnish exports during the 1980s. Among the sectors with heaviest Soviet-trade exposure were textiles, textile products, leather and footwear, with Soviet exports accounting for 29 percent of exports and 34 percent of value added. Machinery and equipment also had significant Soviet exposure at both the aggregate and disaggregated level. The sector with the heaviest exposure was transport equipment, and this exposure was further concentrated in shipbuilding (85 percent of exports designated for the USSR and 225 percent of value added) and railroad equipment (86 percent of exports to USSR and 103 percent of value added). While some manufacturing sectors were particularly specialized in goods destined for the Soviet market, no sector was fully isolated from the loss of Soviet trade.
B.
Specialized products for the Soviet market Finnish exports to the USSR were typically specialized for the Soviet market and did not compete directly with products traded in western markets. To assess the degree of specialization of the goods destined for the USSR, Kajaste (1992) computes the share of Soviet exports at the four-digit level of CCCN classification and finds strong concentration of trade. Conditional on exporting a good to the East, more than 80 percent of all exports of this good went to socialist countries. At the more detailed 7-digit level, Kajaste identifies 133 items with a Soviet export share exceeding 90 percent. These items constituted approximately 40 percent of exports to the USSR. Kajaste also reports that because of the highly specialized nature of goods traded with countries in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the collapse of trade with the Eastern markets was compensated only to a very limited extent by redirecting trade to the West. The extent of specialization was such that firms' capacity developed for trading with the USSR became virtually obsolete overnight. 2, 3 For industries that sent a significant share of their exports to the USSR, the loss of Soviet exports caused total exports to fall, suggesting that the goods were not redirected to other counties. 2 The fact that Finnish exports to the USSR would have little success in the West was clearly understood at the time. Urho Kekkonen, President of the Republic and an active promoter of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, wrote on 20 November 1972: "We must of necessity maintain a relatively large trade with the West, but of much importance is the fact that we are able to sell to the Soviet market in the main such goods that would be very difficult to market into the West." Cited in Sutela (2005) . 3 Another important aspect of trade with the USSR was industry concentration. The five largest exporters accounted for 39.9 percent of all exports, the fifty largest for 78.7 percent, 116 largest for 90 percent (Sutela 2005) . This concentration of the Finnish-Soviet trade resembles trade within CMEA. Given this concentration, economies of scale were often cited as an important source of profitability in the Finnish-Soviet trade. Figure 1 illustrates that at the industry level there is a strong negative correlation between export shares to the USSR in 1988 and deviations of employment from trend in 1993. After the collapse of trade with the USSR in December of 1990, entire industries had to be reorganized (see Sutela (1991) for case studies). Even for industries that had some export recovery (e.g., shipbuilding) the loss of the Soviet market was painful as it involved major transformations in product lines. The strategy of "icebreakers for the communists, luxury liners for the capitalists" meant that production facilities specialized for Soviet production had to be shut down.
Panel C in

C.
Overvalued terms of trade Trade between Finland and the USSR was governed by a series of five-year, highly regulated trade agreements, similar to the agreements between the USSR and its East European allies. These agreements established the volume and composition of trade between the two countries. By the late 1980s the trade arrangements had evolved into a barter of Finnish manufactures for Soviet raw materials, principally crude oil. Trade was to be balanced annually, though arrangements were periodically made to allow for temporary imbalances. 4 The five-year trade agreements established explicit quotas for the export of manufactures to the USSR. While the volume of exports was established by the bilateral trade agreement, the specific quantities and unit prices of the items to be exported were established through direct negotiations. Trade associations conducted the negotiations, applied for export licenses from the Finnish government, and distributed the rights to export among their members. A key condition of the export license was an 80 percent domestic content restriction.
More than 90 percent of imported oil and 100 percent of Finland's imported natural gas came from the USSR. In principle, the rate of exchange of Finnish goods for Soviet energy was to take place at world prices. The value of crude oil was easy to observe and was set at the dollar price of crude oil on the world market and then converted to rubles using the official ruble/dollar exchange rate. The market value of Finnish exports to the USSR was less obvious. The evidence suggests that over time the rate of exchange (goods per barrel of oil) tilted in Finland's favor. For example, interviews and surveys with managers and industry experts suggest that exporting to the USSR was a lucrative business for Finnish firms (Kajaste, 1992) . Pre-commitment to the five-year contracts eliminated exchange rate and business cycle risk for firms. Kajaste (1992, p. 29) concludes that "[Soviet] exports seem to have been exceptionally profitable."
A more formal measure of the premium associated with exporting to the USSR is the markup on Soviet exports relative to similar goods destined for western markets. Using data from the 1980s, Kajaste (1992) estimates the markup using unit prices of Soviet and non-Soviet exports and finds that the prices of exports to the Soviet Union were at least 9.5 percent higher than those for exports to western markets. We replicate this analysis using trade data at the 5-digit-level of SITC disaggregation for 1990 and find an even larger markup of 36 percent. This markup suggests that if a Finnish industry redirected its Soviet trade to other countries, its goods would be competitive only if sold at a 10 to 36 percent discount. 5 Hence, the Finnish economy was subsidized by overvalued prices of Finnish manufactures bartered for Soviet oil so that the effective price of Soviet oil was at least 10 percent cheaper than its market price.
D.
The unanticipated collapse of trade It seems remarkable ex post that Finnish firms, and indeed the world at large, were caught short by the implosion of the USSR. To be sure, trade flows to the USSR had fallen off in the late 1980s. Part of the decline was an endogenous contraction resulting from falling oil prices. The decline was also a consequence of the reforms under Perestroika, which attempted to decentralize Soviet decisionmaking but made it difficult for Finnish firms to identify those with real authority on the Soviet end. 5 There are several reasons why the USSR was willing to overpay for Finnish goods. First, neutral Finland was the key source of modern Western know-how for the USSR. Other countries had much tighter export controls against the Soviet bloc that were designed to block the transfer of technology. Second, the USSR used the Finnish-Soviet trade as a lab for testing various forms of capitalist and socialist cooperation and as a guarantee of peaceful co-existence. For example, Urho Kekkonen, the Finnish prime minister and president for three decades, wrote in 1974, "…our whole stable foreign policy course demands that we do keep the Soviet markets." Third, the Soviet subsidy was aimed at maintaining political status quo in Finland where left parties played an important role. A former leader of Soviet intelligence in Finland once wrote, "One can go to any lengths in thinking, if Kekkonen was a Soviet 'agent of influence', but hardly anybody denies that the Finns had a president who pumped enormous amounts of economic benefit from Soviet leaders against short-term political concessions … and thus Finnish standards of living increased" (cited in Sutela 2007). However, the expressed belief that the trade arrangement with the USSR would persist appeared in government reports, interviews with policy makers, and corporate forecasts. Even after the announcement that the trade contracts were to be canceled, a representative of the central bank suggested that it was still possible that the system would be reformed, and not fully dismantled. The private sector was equally surprised by the collapse of the Soviet trade.
6
The collapse was quick and deep. On December 6, 1990 the Soviet authorities informed their Finnish counterparts that all trade arrangements were cancelled without any transitional period.
Imports of oil from the (former) USSR fell from 8.2 million tons in 1989 to 1.3 million tons in 1992.
Finnish exports to the (former) USSR tumbled down by 84 percent over the same period.
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E.
Rigidity of the labor market To fully understand the reaction of the Finnish economy to the shocks caused by the collapse of Soviet trade, it is important to examine the Finnish labor market, which is notable for its high degree of unionization. In the early 1990s approximately 85 percent of workers belonged to unions and almost 95 percent of workers were covered by collective agreements (Böckerman and Uusitalo, 2006) . Since most employers are organized in federations, the wage bargaining normally starts at the national level. If a federation or union rejects the nation-wide agreement, it can negotiate its own terms. Collective agreements stipulate the wages for different levels of job complexity, education, etc. in a given industry. Typically, agreements allow for upward wage drift if firms perform well.
Although the government does not have a formal role in the bargaining process, the government usually intermediates negotiations.
8 Not surprisingly, Finland is often classified as a country with highly centralized wage setting (e.g., Botero et al. 2004 ).
6 Nokia, a major exporter of telecommunications technology to the USSR, forecast strong sales to the Soviet Union for 1991. However, actual sales in January and February of 1991 came in at just 2 million markka ($469,000 US) instead of the projected 121 million markka ($28.1 million US), forcing the company to dramatically change its business plan (Haikio, 2001, p. 76) . 7 Allowing economic agents to learn in 1990Q3 or 1990Q4 that the trade will collapse in 1 or 2 quarters does not materially change our results. 8 See Snellman (2005) for a more detailed description of the wage bargaining process in Finland.
Unions did not agree to cut nominal wages in 1992-1993, which were the peak years of the depression. Instead, wages were frozen at the 1991 level (see Appendix D). Panel D in Figure 1 reports the distribution of wage changes in 1992 for individual non-manual workers in manufacturing.
Strikingly, the fraction of workers with no wage change reached 75 percent. Thus, the national agreement was binding for a broad array of firms and workers. Given that inflation was quite moderate in the 1990s and there was a positive drift in the nominal wages (which corresponds to the right tail of the distribution of wage growth in Panel D of Figure 1 ), real wages fell only to a limited extent. These findings are consistent with Dickens et al. (2007) who cite Finland as a country with one of the greatest downward wage rigidities.
A Model of the Finnish Economy
In this section we develop a model of the Finnish economy that captures the key features of its trading relationship with the Soviet Union and the Finnish labor market. These features include the volume of trade, the composition of trade, overvalued terms of trade, low elasticity of substitution between goods destined for the Soviet market and western markets, and rigid labor markets.
We model the Finnish economy as a small open economy with three sectors. 9 Sector 1 (nonSoviet sector) produces a traded good consumed at home and sold abroad in western markets. Sector 2 (Soviet sector) produces a good that can be consumed at home or sold exclusively to the USSR.
Sector 3 (services) produces non-tradables. Our baseline functional forms and parameters produce equilibrium allocations consistent with the Finnish economy prior to the Soviet trade collapse.
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A. Households The representative household chooses a lifetime plan for consumption and labor allocations to maximize utility taking all goods and factor prices as given. The utility function is 9 The "small open economy" assumption means that Finnish exports faced a perfectly elastic demand curve in foreign markets which seems to be a reasonable approximation because Finnish goods had relatively small market shares in their main foreign destinations. 10 Appendix C shows that our results are robust to relaxing several assumptions of the baseline setup. In particular, we introduce habit persistence in consumption, vary the elasticities of substitution between sectoral labor supplies, allow for adjustment costs in investment and labor, allow for less-than-unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, and introduce imperfect substitutability of labor supply across sectors.
, where is a consumption aggregator over four consumption goods and for 1,2,3 is the labor supplied to each sector. The consumption aggregator is given by where are weights in the consumption aggregator, is the consumption of the non-Soviet traded good produced by sector 1, is the consumption of the good produced by the sector with Soviet exposure, is the consumption of services, and is the consumption of a good imported from the western markets.
We follow Greenwood et al. (1988) and assume a period utility function , , ∑ where 1/ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and is the scale of disutility from working in sector j. Note that under this assumption households can adjust their labor input in each sector. However, the utility from each type of leisure is not perfectly substitutable so a decrease in labor input in sector 2, which will occur in response to the collapse of export to the Soviet Union, will not translate into a one-for-one increase in labor supply in the other, expanding sectors. In this sense, labor is sector specific and hence wages are not generally equalized across sectors. 11 Total employment is defined as .
We assume that households are exclusive owners of domestic firms. Households face the following budget constraint:
, where is the wage rate in sector 1,2,3, is a one-period bond denominated in units of the world tradable good and traded in international markets at the gross world interest rate of , is the price of capital K jt in sector j, is the dividend rate on capital in sector and is the relative price of goods in sector j (we take good 1 as numeraire so 1).
B. Firms
Firms in all three sectors use inputs of capital, labor and energy (E) to produce the final good in that sector. The problem faced by the representative firm in each sector is to choose inputs to maximize profits taking factor prices as given. In sector 1,2,3, the representative firm maximizes:
where is the rate of depreciation of the capital stock, is a capital adjustment cost coefficient, and is the relative price of energy.
Production functions are given by min , , , for 1,2,3, where is the energy requirement in sector j, and is the labor weight in the capital-labor aggregator.
We assume that energy and value added are perfect complements because the ability of firms to substitute away from energy is very small in the short run. At an optimum, no input is wasted so . Value added is defined as / and the corresponding value added function as , , , , . Note that for simplicity the three sectors do not have direct linkages via input-output relationships.
C. Market clearing and equilibrium
In sector 1, output is consumed, invested in that same sector (since investment I is also sector specific)
0, where measures net exports of the non-Soviet good.
These are exports of goods to western markets in exchange for energy imports, , purchased at a world relative price , and for imports of good purchased at world relative price . Hence, the non-Soviet balance of trade is .
In the Soviet sector, output is consumed by domestic consumers, invested in sector 2, or sold to the Soviet Union in exchange for energy: 0, where measures export to the USSR. To capture the clearing system in the Finnish-Soviet trade, we assume that trade with the Soviet Union is balanced at all times: 0, where is the barter price of energy contracted with the Soviet union for a quantity of energy imports. The values of and are fixed, since they were set by the five-year agreements between Finland and the USSR.
We assume that Finland produces no energy domestically and energy is not storable so that imports of energy are equal to domestic consumption of energy: 0.
In sector 3 domestic production equals domestic absorption: 0.
We follow Shimer (2010) and model the rigidity of the labor market as a slow adjustment of wages in each sector 1,2,3:
, where the parameter governs the degree of wage stickiness and is the reservation wage given by the household labor supply. One interpretation of these wage dynamics is that trade unions take the wage in the previous period as a starting point in bargaining ("status quo" wages) and gradually change the wage to increase the employment of union workers. Specifically, 1 corresponds to complete real wage rigidity, while 0 corresponds to complete real wage flexibility. Regardless of , we set in the preSoviet-collapse steady state. Given the wage, clearing in the labor market is demand determined (i.e.
by finding the labor allocation that satisfies the labor demand condition and the settled wage).
An equilibrium of this economy is defined by sets of intertemporal sequences of allocations , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . In our quantitative analysis we focus on equilibria that start from initial conditions calibrated to match the Finnish economy at a stationary equilibrium just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with the sequence of exogenous variables set to reflect the sudden increase in the cost of energy and the collapse of the market for exports to the USSR. The precise specification of these initial conditions and shocks is described in the next section.
Quantitative Analysis
A. Detrending and definition of the "Soviet" sector Since our study does not focus on either long-run growth or regular business cycles, but rather on macro dynamics around the Great Depression episode, we filter the data in the following way. First, we express a data series in log first differences and compute the average growth rate over 1975-1986. Then we use this estimate of the growth rate to extrapolate actual series (in levels) for the post-1990 period to construct a forecast, or counterfactual, of the macro dynamics that would have been observed without the Finnish Great Depression during the 1990s (see Appendix B for more details).
Deviations from the predicted trend are interpreted as the dynamics resulting from the depression. We will compare these deviations with the dynamics produced by the model.
One of the challenges in mapping the model to the data is that the pervasiveness of Soviet exports throughout the manufacturing sector makes it difficult to separate out a "Soviet" sector from a "non-Soviet" sector. The "Soviet-exposed" sector will be defined in the data as a weighted index of industrial sectors. We define as the share of exports of industry i at time t to the USSR in total exports of industry i. Let be e.g. value added in industry i at time t. Then we compute value added in the Soviet-exposed sector as ∑ and correspondingly the non-Soviet-exposed sector is ∑ 1 . We treat services as a separate sector producing non-tradable goods. We allow the weights, to change over the 1989-1992 period. The relative size of the Soviet sector will therefore decline automatically as trade with the USSR collapses. Since our model does not include the government sector, which is governed by different objectives and did not experience any major changes during the depression, we adjusted the data to exclude the public sector.
B.
Calibration We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency to match macroeconomic aggregates in the year 1989.
The discount factor is 0.99 which, given that output per capita grew approximately 2 percent per year in Finland before 1991, implies an annual real interest rate of 6 percent per year, consistent with the 6.1 percent per year real lending rate in Finland before 1991. We choose an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5. Hall (2007) and Kimball and Shapiro (2010) Turning to the production side of the model, the parameters can be determined from labor compensation in value added so that 0.57, 0.63 and 0.63. The quarterly deprecation rate of capital, , is the same across sectors and set to match an annual depreciation rate of ten percent. We assume small to moderate adjustment costs in capital stock ( = 1). Without loss of generality, we define units of oil in such a way that the unit price of oil before the collapse of the Soviet Union is equal to one (i.e., 1). Because energy and value added are Leontief complements, the energy requirement in the non-Soviet sector is given by / . Since we know the cost structure (specifically expenditures on energy), we can compute the energy requirement for the non-Soviet sector as the ratio of cost (value added plus energy expenditures) to energy expenditures. For the non-Soviet sector this ratio is equal to 21.56. For other sectors, we cannot make this calculation directly because it depends on prices determined at equilibrium. We can impute the relative prices using cost shares for labor, capital labor ratios and relative wages and then compute energy intensity for the Soviet and service sectors: 37.84 and 47.51. Since more than 90 percent of energy was imported from the USSR, we assume that in the pre-Sovietcollapse period no energy was imported from other countries. The disutility weights on labor  are set to match the sectoral share of employment (i.e. / ) in each sector.
These parameters pin down the ratios of macroeconomic variables relative to total output and the allocation of factors across sectors (see Table 1 ). The model captures the ratios of aggregate consumption, investment and exports to output. At the sectoral level, parameters are chosen to match consumption, labor and energy allocations. The model slightly overstates the size of the non-Soviet sector relative to the size of the service sector.
The final parameter to be calibrated is the extent of wage rigidity which affects the transition dynamics, but not the steady state allocations. As we have discussed above, wages in Finland are downwardly rigid and wage adjustment in the early 1990s was very slow. Indeed, we do not observe large movements in real or nominal wages in Finland over the 1990s. In light of these facts, we set 0.96, which is just a notch higher than 0.95 calibrated in Shimer (2010) 
C. Simulating the Effects of the Soviet Shocks: Benchmark results
We now use the calibrated version of our model to show that the shocks caused by the loss of Soviet trade can result in a significant reduction of output, similar to the decline observed in the data. We model these shocks as a once-and-for-all unanticipated event at 0 in a deterministic environment.
As we explained above, this event produced two shocks for Finland. First, Finland lost one of its major export markets. Because of the specialized nature of trade with the USSR, Finnish firms could not easily redirect trade to other countries. We model this shock as a permanent drop in Soviet oil imports to zero for all 0 which implies that exports to the USSR also vanish for all 0.
The second shock was the end of the Soviet Union's provision of subsidized energy for Finland.
Evidence in Section 2 suggests that this subsidy was at least 10 percent of the world oil price. Thus we assume that the second shock was equivalent to an increase in the oil price from 1 to 1.1 for all 0. We hit our model economy with these shocks as of the initial date 0 and compute the transitional dynamics leading to the new post-Soviet-collapse stationary equilibrium. 14 The model predicts a 26 percent decline in investment over 1991-1993 and a recovery to about 12 percent below trend. The actual collapse in investment was more severe in both the short-and the long-run. In the model, the recovery of investment reflects the fact that given our functional form assumptions and calibrated parameter values, the capital-to-output ratio (and hence the investment-to-12 Following Mendoza and Tesar (1998) , we address the dependency on initial conditions of the steady state of net foreign assets by combining a shooting algorithm with log-linear approximations around the post-Soviet-collapse steady state. We set the initial condition B t = 0 because, in the Finnish NIPA accounts, the 1980-1990 average net exports (or current account) to GDP ratio was close to zero. 13 Model series are aggregated from quarterly frequency to annual frequency to compare with the dynamics in the data. 14 In our model, all prices (except real wages) are entirely flexible since our objective is to use the standard international real business cycle framework. However, one can expect that introducing sticky prices in the model could reduce the degree of real wage stickiness required to generate persistent and large contraction as well as comovement across sectors. Given that in our model prices are flexible, one can interpret our results as providing a lower bound on how much the collapse of the trade shock can explain the depression. We thank one of the referees for this observation.
output ratio) is fairly insensitive to changes in the price of energy, relative prices and wages. 15 Hence, the post-shock steady-state level of aggregate investment is fairly invariant to the Soviet shock. If utilization of capital required energy (as in e.g. Finn (2000) ), the relative price of capital would be higher in the post-Soviet-collapse period and the decline in investment larger and more persistent.
The model also captures well some of the features of the adjustment of net exports. The ratio of net exports to gross output rises by about five percentage points shortly after shocks hit the model economy, but this is a transitory surplus. The data show a surplus of similar magnitude, but it builds up more gradually and is more persistent than in the model. percent, increasing the rigidity of wages, and adding other frictions to the model (habit formation in consumption and quadratic labor and investment adjustment costs; see appendix C for more details on specification of these frictions). Reading across the table, each column shows i) the decomposition of output contraction into contractions in main spending components (columns 2 through 4) and ii) the predictions for output resulting from different shocks to the model economy. Column 6 shows the output drop when the shock is the loss of trade but the energy subsidy is not removed. Column 7 performs the opposite experiment -the only shock is a spike in the price of oil, with no loss in Soviet trade. Column 8 examines the drop in output when the shock is assumed to have no effect on the demand for services. Finally, column 9 shows the results in an economy with fully flexible wages.
Beginning with the third row, we find that a higher markup on Finnish exports to the USSR (effectively a bigger shock to the price of oil) deepens the output drop in both the short-and the long-15 Specifically, in the steady state ⁄ 1 1 / 1 1 , which follows from the first order condition for capital in sector j. Since is relatively large, one needs large variation in and to change capital to output ratio significantly.
run. Imposing more rigid wages (fourth row) relative to the benchmark (second row) similarly produces a larger drop in both the short-and the long-run. Adding further frictions to the model economy (the second to the last row of the table) has minimal impact on the depth of the output drop, but slows the recovery of output after the shock.
A comparison of Columns 6 and 7 can be interpreted as a decomposition of the Soviet trade shocks into the effects induced by the reallocation of factors away from the Soviet-goods industry and the effects of the loss of the energy subsidy. It is clear that factor reallocation costs account for most of the drop in output. However, the bigger the markup, the bigger the pre-shock subsidy to energy, and the more severe the economic contraction when the subsidy is removed.
The results in Column 8 illustrate the pivotal role played by the service (nontraded) sector.
When all goods are tradable, the collapse of Soviet trade puts pressure on factors to shift from the Soviet to non-Soviet sector. This happens for two reasons: first because the relative price of the Soviet-goods falls, and second, all of Finland's energy needs now have to be financed by exports of the non-Soviet good. Sector 2 contracts, sector 1 expands and aggregate output drops by 5 to 6 percent. A higher markup on exports and more rigid wages contribute to the output drop, but the twosector model (i.e., when the service sector is held fixed) cannot come close to the data.
Another critical ingredient for generating a deep contraction is wage stickiness. With flexible wages, the maximum contraction is less than half of that in the baseline model (compare Columns 1 and 9). However, it is the combination of imperfectly flexible wages and a collapse in the demand for nontradables that leads to a large amplification of the Soviet trade shock. In effect, the nontraded goods sector is struck by two negative shocks. First, the increase in the price of energy increases the cost of production. Second, the income effect from the collapse of Soviet trade reduces the demand for nontraded goods. These two effects together lead to a decline in the relative price of nontraded goods and output. Both of these negative shocks are larger the more rigid are wages because more rigid wages force firms to cut employment rather than adjust the wage, the price of nontradables falls more, and the income effect is larger. Figure 3 provides suggestive evidence that these sectoral dynamics were an important part of the Finnish depression. Consistent with the data, the benchmark model predicts a large contraction of output in the services sector (esp. with rigid wages). Likewise, the model predicts a 9.5 percent fall in the relative price of the nontradables (the benchmark case) which is close to the 13 percent decline in the data. The model does not, however, captures the full decline in the non-Soviet sector.
In summary, there are two key determinants of a deep contraction: wage stickiness and dynamics in the service sector. To the extent our results depend on adjustment of real wages being sufficiently slow, which is supported by the evidence presented in Section 2, our findings echo the results in Cole and Ohanian (2004) . Since habit formation and labor/investment adjustment costs improve the fit of the model, our subsequent analysis incorporates these additional frictions.
D.
1974 oil price shock A useful cross-check on the performance of the model in explaining the recession in the 1990s is to ask how well this framework can reproduce dynamics in response to previous episodes of energy price shocks. We examine in particular how the model fares in accounting for the macroeconomic dynamics in Finland after the 1974 oil price shock. Like the collapse of Soviet trade, this shock produced a large increase in energy costs for Finland. Unlike the Soviet trade collapse, however, it did not cause a major dislocation in Finland's economic structure and sectoral factor allocations. In particular, during this episode Finland continued to import subsidized energy from the USSR in exchange for specialized exports. Thus, if in this 1974 oil price shock experiment the model dynamics are still consistent with those observed in the data, the conclusions derived in the previous subsection are more credible. In this exercise, we keep the model calibrated as before. The only modifications we make is to energy intensity, which we set 25 percent higher than in the baseline calibration, because the Finnish economy was more energy intensive in 1970s than in early 1990s. 16 Since Finland was also less unionized in the early 1970s, we also consider faster wage adjustment with 0.9 for all j.
Although most economies experienced the oil price shock early in 1974, the shock to the Finnish economy was somewhat delayed because the oil price in the Finnish-Soviet trade was a moving average of the world price. Hence, we assume that the shock to the world price occurs in the first quarter of 1974 and it hits the Finnish economy in the last quarter of 1974. To calibrate the size of the shock, we compute the unit price of imported oil in 1973 and 1974 and find that the (log) change in the price was 109 percent. 
Alternative explanations of the depression
A. Productivity and tax shocks One theory of the Finnish Great Depression is the "tax and productivity" hypothesis of Conesa et al. (2007) , which argues that the depression was caused by adverse total factor productivity (TFP) and labor tax shocks. Note that, as argued in Finn (2000) , our oil price hike works like a technology shock since an increase in the oil price reduces firms' profit margins (provided there is a sufficiently small substitutability of energy input). Although the effect of the oil price shock on measured TFP is relatively small in our model, the trade shock leads to a significant decline in measured TFP with dynamics that resemble the path of measured TFP in the data (Panel B, Figure 5 ). Intuitively, with sector specific factors, changes in sectoral demands drive a wedge in returns on inputs across sectors in the short run. In contrast, the standard approach to TFP accounting assumes that returns are 16 The ratio of energy consumption (in millions of TOE) to GDP (in constant 2000 prices) in 1973 was 25% larger than the same ratio in 1989. equalized across sectors, which can overstate the contribution of inputs in relatively unproductive sectors such as the Soviet sector in our model, and hence can show a decrease in aggregate measured TFP even when TFP at the sectoral level does not change. What Conesa et al. interpret as a TFP shock could be partly capturing the energy price and trade shocks in our model. We can also reconcile Conesa et al.'s labor-tax-like effects with our analysis by interpreting those effects as taking the place of the wage rigidities in our model. In an equilibrium without labor frictions, the wage received by workers is equal to their reservation wage, i.e.
. If wages are rigid, the reservation wage is not generally equal to the wage actually received. Furthermore, in a downturn, workers are willing to accept jobs at lower wages, but with inflexible wages there is a difference between current market wages and the reservation wages, in particular . Since firms stay on their labor demand curve, they cut employment. In light of these arguments, we can reconcile decreased employment (as observed in the data) with fully flexible wages (as assumed by Conesa et al.) , if we interpret this situation as if there was a 'labor tax' shock. In other words, one can interpret as arising from a labor tax such that 1 where the aftertax wage is equal to the reservation wage.
While both labor tax hikes and wage rigidities can have similar theoretical effects, we were unable to find actual evidence of significant changes in tax rates in the Finnish press and legislation of the early 1990s. In addition, various measures of the tax burden on labor earnings exhibit little variation over this period (see Panel A, Figure 5 ). If anything, marginal rates of the personal income tax in Finland fell in the early 1990s. For example, the top bracket tax rate fell from 51% in 1988 to 43% in 1990 and further to 39% in 1991. By contrast, we documented earlier strong evidence of labor rigidities, including wage stickiness. Hence, the empirical evidence suggests that labor frictions may be more relevant than tax shocks. Overall, we agree with the view of Conesa et al. (2007) that productivity and wage-wedge movements are necessary to explain the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates. However, we interpret these movements as symptoms rather than causes and argue that the Soviet trade shock is the fundamental force behind these movements.
B.
Financial shocks Another competing explanation of the Finnish Great Depression is the "financial view," which attributes the depression to the major financial crisis experienced in Finland in 1992. According to the financial view, financial liberalization during the 1980s resulted in an over-expansion of credit, an over-valued stock market, inflated real estate values and a large stock of debt. A downturn in the economy in the early 1990s due to the loss of the Soviet export market and a slowdown in European growth triggered both a speculative attack on the currency and a credit crunch. Clearly these factors played a role but they can also be interpreted as a byproduct of the financial-sector effects of the Soviet trade shocks that first caused a severe collapse of the real economy. Indeed, troubles in the Finnish financial sector seem to have followed the collapse of the Soviet trade rather than preceded it. 17 This interpretation of the financial sector as "following" the real economy can be rationalized if we assume that financial variables responded to real developments as in a classic cash-in-advance setup. Hence, the severe retrenchment in consumption and investment expenditures due only to the Soviet trade collapse could have caused a proportional collapse in demand for real balances, which under a managed exchange rate and a set level of foreign reserves, could have been large enough to trigger a currency crash. 18 If we consider also the possibility of financial amplification via a workingcapital or a financial accelerator channel, these developments could have fed back into the real economy and enlarged the magnitude and duration of the recession. 17 Real domestic credit, which had increased at a steady pace since the late 1970s, began to fall in 1992:1 and the exchange rate experienced a first initial depreciation in 1991Q4, with a full currency collapse in 1992Q4. Real GDP began contracting in the last quarter of 1990. In a comprehensive analysis of the banking crisis and credit crunch in Finland, Vihriälä (1997) concludes that collapse of lending is better explained by a decline in firm and household balance sheets and creditworthiness than by a contraction in supply of credit. 18 Our theoretical framework is formulated in terms of real variables and thus nominal devaluations are beyond our model, but we can explore how an increase in the price of imported goods affects the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates. Specifically, we shock the price of the imported good (C 4 ) by two devaluations: 12% in 1991Q4 and 13% in 1992Q4 (the timing and the magnitude of devaluations of the Finnish markka). Overall, these shocks help to generate more prolonged deviations from trend (in part because shocks occur well after 1991Q1, when we hit the model economy with the Soviet trade shock) but our qualitative and largely quantitative results are similar to the baseline set of results. More results are available upon request.
We can gather a sense of the extent to which a credit crunch can explain the depression by introducing into our framework an exogenous, persistent increase in the world interest rate that arrives as a large, unexpected shock. This is similar to the approach followed in some of the literature using quantitative DSGE models to examine the dynamics of financial crises (e.g. Gertler et al. (2007) ).
However, we focus mainly on the effect of interest rate shocks operating via the opportunity cost of capital and the intertemporal cost of borrowing, abstracting from financial accelerator or Fisherian debt-deflation mechanisms that the financial crises literature emphasizes.
Panel C in Figure 5 shows the path of the nominal interest rates in Finland (HELIBOR) and Germany (FIBOR) as well as the Finnish CPI inflation rate. Note that nominal and real interest rates in Finland were high well before the start of the recession. These high rates were largely driven by increased interest rates in Germany as the Bundesbank raised interest rates to fight inflationary expectations fueled by the German reunification. The spread between the Finnish and German interest rates, however, has two important spikes in 1991Q4 and 1992Q2. At these times, the Bank of Finland raised the interest rate to defend the Finnish markka from speculative attacks. These defensive measures increased quarterly averages of the HELIBOR by about 2 percent.
We introduce the interest rate shock by assuming that, in addition to the Soviet shock, the model economy is also hit with these two-percent increases in the world interest rate in 1991Q4 and 1992Q2. The serial correlation of the interest rate shock is set to 0.9 which is approximately the persistence of the interest rate in Finland. 
Extension to Transition Economies
There is ample evidence indicating that the trade and energy price shocks faced by the transition economics (TEs) of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were at least as severe as those 19 Comparing the developments in Sweden and Finland between 1985 , Jonung et al. (2009 observe that the two countries behaved as if they were "economic twins. " Jonung et al. (2009, Chapter 9 ) also discuss the connection between crises in Scandinavian countries in the early 1990s and Asian crises in the late 1990s. Although there are some parallels with the Asian crises, the crisis in Finland is distinctive in having an important trade shock.
experienced by Finland. The practice of overpricing machines exported from CMEA countries to the Soviet Union and underpricing raw materials (mainly energy) exported from the Soviet Union to CMEA countries is well documented (e.g., Marrese and Vanous 1983) . Orlowski (1993) , Krasnov and Brada (1997) and others find the same pattern for intra-USSR trade. Rodrik (1994) and others document that goods exported from CMEA countries to the USSR were tailored to Soviet specifications and could be sold in the West only with large discounts. Finally, as observed in Rodrik (1994) , the sharp increase in unemployment rates across transition countries is prima facie evidence that wages were inflexible. Given that the size of distortions was greater in former CMEA countries than in Finland (e.g., greater subsidy from USSR and greater specialization of trade with the USSR), one can expect that standard macroeconomic factors can explain the bulk of downturn in economic activity in transition countries even if wages in these countries were more flexible than in Finland. In line with our model's prediction that greater wage inflexibility leads to deeper downturns, the model has a better fit to the data for Hungary when we use a higher value of θ which is consistent with the fact that Hungary had a slower wage adjustment than Poland. Even for relatively flexible wages the Soviet shock accounts for at least 50 percent of the contraction in these countries. 21 We also conjecture that misallocation of resources in the former Soviet Union could have played an important role in the dramatic output decline in Russia and other former Soviet republics in 20 Akerlof et al. (1991) also argue that high and inflexible real wages contributed to long and deep contraction in East Germany after the German reunification. 21 More generally, we find a strong negative relationship between real wages and employment in transition economies. In other words, countries with smaller declines in real wages experienced a larger contraction of employment between 1989 and 1995, which is consistent with our argument that incomplete adjustment of real wages could have contributed to the depth of downturn in transition economies. See Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) for more details.
the early 1990s. Indeed, an enormous fraction of the Soviet economy was militarized (15-20 percent of GNP according to various estimates, e.g. Steinberg (1992) ) and had only limited ability to switch production to non-military goods. A tremendous shift in demand towards consumer goods meant a gigantic transfer of resources which was probably even more painful and costly than in other countries in the socialist camp. In other words, the shock was internal rather than external. In addition, many relatively energy-poor Soviet republics (e.g., Ukraine) had to buy oil and gas at higher prices that when combined with the loss of demand from other Soviet republics, resembles the shock experienced by other Eastern European countries and Finland.
Concluding Remarks
We argue that the Finnish Great Depression can be explained to a large extent by two exogenous shocks produced by the collapse of the Finnish-Soviet trade: the surge in energy prices and the sudden redundancy of the Soviet-oriented manufacturing industry. Since the identification of these shocks is particularly clear cut, this natural experiment clearly illustrates the behavior of a small open economy in response to large exogenous shocks affecting energy costs and sectoral factor allocations. We find that two important features of the Finnish economy contributed to amplification of the initial shocks into a Great Depression: rigid real wages and the collapse of demand for nontraded goods.
Our model can also be extended to account for the main features of the early 1990s adjustment observed in Eastern European transition economies, which displayed output dynamics and shocks to energy costs and sectoral factor allocation induced by the collapse of trade with the USSR similar to those observed in Finland. This similarity is particularly striking and calls for a reinterpretation of the sources of deep recessions in transition economies since Finland, in contrast to transition economies, had a well functioning system of markets, courts and other institutions. Although we cannot rule out alternative explanations for contractions in transition economies, the quantitative responses to the shocks triggered by the collapse of Soviet trade can account for a large share of the contraction in transition countries and Finland. This important finding suggests that alternative explanations such as institutional transformations could have had a smaller effect than previously thought. The Finnish experience can also shed new light on the post-WWII contractions after rapid changes in the composition of aggregate demand (e.g., disarmament in the U.S. after the Korean War).
The depression in Finland led to dramatic changes in the Finnish economy (e.g., increased export orientation, the rise of Nokia and the telecommunications industry, a fall in unionization rates) and policy (e.g. adoption of inflation targeting, reduced taxation, and more decentralized wage setting). Analyzing the effects of these changes is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the depression of the 1990s as well as policy responses during the depression and its aftermath have been highly informative for policymakers and academics about how a country can turn around after a deep contraction and how policy should be directed to prevent or minimize the consequences of adverse shocks. Further analysis of the Finnish experience is a fruitful avenue for future research. Notes: the table reports moments of the data for sectors constructed as described in appendixes A and B. Ratio of energy cost to value added computes the ratio of the cost of imported energy to value added in a given industry. We use the input-output table for 1989 to allocate of the cost of imported energy across sectors. More rigid wages, =0.99
Output drop (peak to trough) -20.5 -18.1 -7.2 0.6 4.0 -17.2 -3.3 -6.9 -8.3 Output drop after 7 years -13.4 -10.0 -3.6 -0.7 0.9 -11.0 -2.4 -6.0 -7.9
All adjustment costs included Output drop (peak to trough) -17.0 -11.9 -6.5 -0.4 1.8 -14.5 -2.5 -6.4 -8.2 Output drop after 7 years -10.8 -8.6 -2.5 -0.4 0.7 -9.0 -1.8 -5.2 -7.9
Additional interest rate shock Output drop (peak to trough) -21.1 -13.9 -12.5 2.6 2.6 -18.5 -2.6 -9.2 -9.8 Output drop after 7 years -12.4 -8.9 -2.8 -1.7 0.9 -10.5 -1.9 -8.1 -8.2 Notes: "Loss of trade shock only" scenario assumes that the price of oil is the same before and after the collapse of the USSR. "Oil price shock only" scenario assumes that the volume of trade with the USSR does not change but the price of oil increases. "Hold service sector fixed" scenario assumes that the service sector is fixed at pre-collapse levels and does not respond to shocks. "No wage rigidity" scenario assumes that 0 for all j. The case "Higher markup, 30%" sets the size of the oil price increase equal to 30 percent. The case "All adjustment costs included" augments the baseline model with internal habit formation, quadratic labor and investment adjustment costs (see Appendix C for more details on specification of these frictions). The case "Additional interest rate shock" presents the response when the model economy (with all adjustment costs included) is hit with the Soviet shock in 1991Q1 and two percent interest rate shocks in 1991Q4 and 1992Q2. Level relative to 1990, 1990=100 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Notes:
The figures plot percent deviations from trend in the data and simulated model series. Scenario "fully flexible wages" sets  1 =  2 =  3 = 0. Scenario "fully rigid wages" sets  1 =  2 =  3 = 0.99975. Scenario "adjustement costs included" presents the response of the economy when, in addition to capital adjustment costs, the following is included: habit formation in consumption ( 0.8 , quadratic investment adjustment costs ( 0.5 , quadratic labor adjustment costs 1 and wage adjustment is set to  1 =  2 =  3 = 0.98. See Appendix C for more details on specification of these frictions. Scenario "baseline + interest rate shock" presents the response when the model economy (with all adjustment costs included) is hit with the Soviet shock in 1991Q1 and two percent interest rate shocks in 1991Q4 and 1992Q2. The shaded region shows 90% confidence interval (consistent with unit root tests, each series is assumed to be a difference stationary process). 
The figures plot percent deviations from trend in the data and simulated model series of value added in the Soviet, non-Soviet and service sectors. Scenario "fully flexible wages" sets  1 =  2 =  3 = 0. Scenario "fully rigid wages" sets  1 =  2 =  3 = 0.99975. Scenario "adjustement costs included" presents the response of the economy when, in addition to capital adjustment costs, the following is included: habit formation in consumption ( 0.8 , quadratic investment adjustment costs ( 0.5 , quadratic labor adjustment costs 1 and wage adjustment is set to  1 =  2 =  3 = 0.98. See Appendix C for more details on specification of these frictions. Scenario "baseline + interest rate shock" presents the response when the model economy (with all adjustment costs included) is hit with the Soviet shock in 1991Q1 and two percent interest rate shocks in 1991Q4 and 1992Q2. The shaded region shows 90% confidence interval (consistent with unit root tests, each series is assumed to be a difference stationary process). 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Sweden Finland 
Appendix B: Detrending and construction of sectoral data
Since our study does not focus on long-run growth, we study macroeconomic aggregates after filtering out their long-run trends. Figure B1 plots the dynamics of the series and the fitted time trend. To exclude the effect of the post-Soviet period we use data only for [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] to fit the time trend. We interpret the trend as the (counterfactual) dynamics of variables that we would have observed if there was no collapse of the Soviet Union and interpret deviations from trend as an impulse response to the Soviet trade shock. To make the comparison between model and data series straightforward, we rescale the filtered series so that they are equal to zero in 1990, see Figure B3 . Note that the detrended series exhibit a much stronger decline than the raw series. For example, real value added falls by 11 percent, while filtered real value added decreases by more than 20 percent. Our analysis of the Finnish recession requires construction of the Soviet sector. Ideally we would like to have firm-level data with product output and export by destination. With this information, we could aggregate output of goods predominantly exported to the Soviet Union and treat this aggregate as the Soviet sector. The advantage of this approach is that we would be able to control for entry/exit decisions at the firm level as well as creation and destruction of products. These data would also allow us to assess to what extent trade with the USSR was redirected to other countries. Unfortunately, these data are not available and thus we construct the Soviet sector using industry level data. The risk of working with industry data is that there could be intra-industry entry and exit of firms and products. For example, shipbuilding firms specialized in producing icebreakers for the USSR left the market while shipbuilding firms specialized in producing cruise liners entered the market. In light of this caveat, we construct the Soviet sector with the following approach.
Define as the share of exports of industry i at time t to the Soviet Union in total exports of industry i. Let be value added (or any other the variable of interest) in industry i at time t. Then we compute value added in the Soviet sector as ∑ and correspondingly the non-Soviet sector is ∑ 1 . To control for entry and exit of firms and products, we assume that the Soviet sector shares in exports to the post-USSR period are fixed at 1992 values when the trade with the Former Soviet Union countries reached its minimum. We also fix the Soviet sector share at 1988 values for the period before 1988 to eliminate the extraordinary expansion of the Soviet sector during the period of very high oil prices in the late 1970s and early 1980s. (Recall that trade between USSR and Finland require balanced trade and SovietFinnish trade agreements stipulated volumes of trade rather than values.) Thus we allow to vary only between 1988 and 1992. We treat services as a separate sector producing non-tradable goods. We provide details on data sources in Appendix A.
We plot series for Soviet, non-Soviet and service sector in Figure B2 . Again, since most series grow over time we remove the trend component by fitting a time trend to each series individually on 1975-1986 data ( Figure B3 ).
Although we do not impose the same trend on macroeconomic aggregates, we find that imposing the same total factor productivity (2.2 percent per year) 22 and labor force growth rates (approximately 1 percent per year) 23 on macroeconomic series leads to deviations from the trend that are close to deviations estimated for each series separately (see Figure B4) . the "potential" given that some of the "potential" was lost as the resources employed in the Soviet sector became obsolete. To address these concerns, we explore how using alternative approaches can affect our estimates of the potential output and consequently output gap as well as similar indicators for other macroeconomic series.
First, we know that Soviet goods were overvalued by 10 or more percent. One can think that removing the Soviet subsidy should make potential output smaller since for the same level of inputs and technology less value of output is generated. We adjust down the estimated trend for output after 1991 by the size of Soviet sector output times the size of the markup. Figure B5 shows that removing the 10% markup only marginally affects our estimate of the gap.
Second, one can think that at least a part of the Soviet sector became obsolete and thus some resources (capital, labor, etc.) should be excluded from calculating the potential output. To assess the quantitative importance of this consideration, we adjust down the estimate trend for output after 1991 by the size of Soviet sector output times the maximum contraction of the Soviet sector we observe. Figure B5 shows that the effect is relatively small as this adjustment moves our output gap measure only by a few percentage points.
Third, it is possible that the Soviet sector grew at a different rate relative to other sectors and maybe this differential can affect at what rate the potential output should increase over time.
To address these concerns, we assume that the growth rate of the potential output should be equal to the growth rate of the non-Soviet sectors. Figure B5 shows that this alternative assumption does not affect our measure of output gap.
Fourth, we can use Okun's law to get a sense of output gap for Finland. Panel C in Figure  B6 shows the dynamics of actual unemployment rate as well as the average unemployment rate in 1970-1989. Although there is a variety of estimates for how output gap corresponds to deviation of unemployment rate from its natural level, the estimates for Finland fall between 1.5 and 2.5, 24 i.e., a one percent point increase in unemployment increases output gap by 1.5-2.5 percent. Panel A in Figure B6 shows that the implied output gap is consistent with the measure of output gap we generate using our simple regression analysis. Panel B in Figure B6 shows that raising the natural rate of unemployment by the size of the maximum employment contraction in the Soviet sector (blue, dotted line in Panel C) shifts the range of implied output gaps but the magnitudes are again very similar to the measure of output gap in our baseline analysis.
From these checks, we conclude that although there could be some variation in the magnitude of output gaps, the deviation from trend we use in our analysis is broadly in line with alternative measures and falls roughly in the middle of the ranges implied by alternative techniques. 
